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Abstract  
The impacts of the government funding on the NGOs in terms of advantages and disadvantages 
has received mixed response from the scholars. This study attempts to review the promises and 
perils of government funding on the NGOs and aims to gather the scattered knowledge from 
literature at one place. Literature review was carried out for the relevant studies. Using the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria established for this article, 31 studies were finally selected for review. 
Using thematic analysis approach, 5 main themes regarding government funding impacts on 
NGOs were extracted from the reviewed 31 studies. The themes are institutional theory and 
Isomorphism, accountability, loss of autonomy, mission drift and crowding out. Some scholars 
and studies linked these themes with underperformance while others linked them with stability of 
the NGOs. Definite results are hard to draw to determine the impacts of government funding on 
NGOs and in fact these impacts depend upon a number of factors such as, age, size, sector, 
demography, political, economic and social environments of an NGO.  
Key words: Government funding; non-government organizations; mission drift; loss of autonomy; 
isomorphism, crowding out 
JEL classification: L31, H53 
Introduction 
NGOs receive different kinds of payments from various sources which include foundation grants, 
government grants, corporate grants, government contracts, donations from individuals, membership dues, 
service-related fees, product-related fees, endowment income and investments (Guo, 2006). Among all 
these resources government funding contitutues an important funding source to the NGOs (Lu, 2015). 
There are many ways through which government can provide finances to NGOs which include outright 
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grants, contracts, reimbursements, vouchers, special tax deductions for contributions to certain kinds of 
organizations or through special tax breaks to supplement the general tax exemption that NGOs enjoy 
(Frumkin &Kim, 2002).  
Prior to the 1980s NGOs were mainly funded through grants, schemes and subsidies, and funding was 
used to be provided as block grants by the governments, however, after increasing trend of collaboration 
between different sectors, NGOs have experienced a shift towards contractual, tied funding programmes 
with government and such shifts have fundamentally altered the relationships between organizations and 
governments and, in turn, between organizations and their communities (Carey & Braunack-Mayer, 2009).  
The contractual funding approach is associated with language and methods of the market which ensures 
the shifting of risk to service providers (NGOs) who only get paid for successful completion of assignments 
on a fixed rate basis (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). As a result of the shift of responsibility from governments 
to NGOs for delivery of vital human services, contracting out to NGOs has become a critical managerial 
option for government at all levels (Frumkin & Kim, 2002). Many NGOs depend on government funding, 
and this financial dependence on public money has increased in recent decades as more government 
funded services are delivered via grants and contracts with NGOs (Chaves, Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 
2004). 
The effects of government funding on NGOs operations has turned out to be a controversial subject and 
researchers have seen both promise and peril in NGOs’ growing financial ties with government (Spooner & 
Dadich, 2010). Spooner & Dadich while identifying the problems of government funding to NGOs states 
that problems of government funding are not only about shortfall but include the impacts of funding 
contracts culture on the ways NGOs operate, fading capacity of NGOs to contribute to social capital or 
public policy, their decreasing ability to collaborate with other NGOs and increasing organizational fragility. 
The uneven relationship between the government and NGOs, the deviation of government objectives and 
NGOs mission and government control on NGOs through the contract details deeply influence the 
existence and level of transaction costs to both recipient NGOs and funders (Brown & Trout, 2004). The 
direct impact of contractual funding is to disadvantage small NGOs which are rich in social capital, and to 
persuade larger ones to adopt many on the corporate practices (Rawsthorne, 2005). 
The increasing trend of government contracting culture of the non-profits has significantly changed 
organizational dynamics and characteristics and tied funding programmes are the main reason for 
changing the nature of service delivery by non-profits and consequently diversion of organizations from 
their community groups (Brown, 1997; Laurie & Bondi, 2005; Owen & Kearns, 2006). The development of 
government contractual funding to NGOs has been seen to draw organizations away from their community 
groups and change the nature of service delivery. (Carey & Braunack-Mayer, 2009). 
Under the contractual and competitive funding model, NGOs have been treated like businesses and they 
are expected to demonstrate accountability and higher performance, while supporting clientele with 
complex needs and managing increased back-office costs (Spooner & Dadich, 2010). Government 
contracts may provide NGOs with necessary financial stability, but at the potential cost of reduced 
autonomy and programmatic inflexibility (Mitchell, 2014). The dependence on government funding leads 
towards the concerns whether it can compromise NGOs’ missions and autonomy (Lu, 2015). Brown and 
Trout (2004) state that the role of NGOs is under threat with the growing use of clauses making funding 
condition on non-engagement in political dialogue. The government funding suppress the poliical activity of 
the NGOs on a simple philosophy, don't-bite-the-hand that- feeds-you resource dependence, which mean, 
NGOs which depend upon the government funding for their survivial abstain from oppositional political 
activity or any any advocacy which is not liked or welcomed by their funders (Chaves et al., 2004). 
The aim of this article is to review the research conducted on the impacts of government funding on the 
NGOs in order to draw on a conclusion in the favour of or against government funding. The objective of this 
review article is to provide a consolidated direction to the NGOs’ policy makers to understand the 
relationship between government funding and their functionality for better performance. Studies on the 
NGOs are widely dispersed in the non-profit literature and are often laborious to find (Edward & Fowler, 
2002). While NGOs phenomenon is not new, the development of research about NGOs is new (Lewis, 
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2006), therefore this article will serve as one stop to understand the government funding impacts in totality 
in terms of their advantages and disadvantages. 
The major databases accessed for the review were EBSCOhost, JSTOR, Sage Journals, Emerald, 
Elsevier, Web of science and google scholar. The English language literature was chosen as the majority 
of studies across the world are reported in English. Other inclusion criteria included peer reviewed journal 
articles and articles reporting results from national NGOs only. Exclusion criteria included studies on 
international NGOs, government reports and survey papers and articles on for-profit organizations. Upon 
retrieval of relevant literature, the forward and backward snowballing technique was used which involved 
consulting the reference lists for further relevant articles. The key terms used for the search were non-
government organizations (NGOs) and its permutations (non-profit organizations, not-for-profit 
organizations, and community organization), government funding to NGOs, impacts of government funding 
on NGOs and contractual funding to NGOs, . The three basic Boolean operators “and”, “or”, “not” were also 
used to interlinked the multiple searching terms and concepts. In order to review the most recent literature 
to reach the latest trends and results, the time frame chosen for reviewed studies and research was from 
2000 to 2015. 
The initial search yielded 497 results, and after initial screening by using inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
419 articles were omitted leaving 78 for further consideration. The remaining 78 articles were examined 
through their titles and abstracts in order to further filter out unwanted articles, yielding 31 studies for final 
review. 
Using thematic analysis approach, 5 main themes and several sub-themes regarding government funding 
impacts were extracted from the reviewed literature which are as follow; institutional theory or isomorphism, 
accountability, loss of autonomy, mission drift and crowding out. These 5 main themes were presented with 
regard to their advantages and disadvantages to the NGOs respectively, as derived from the reviewed 
literature. 
Institutional theory and Isomorphism 
Depending on government funding is more specifically related to greater revenue stability but it may also 
lead towards goal displacement and institutional isomorphism (Mitchell, 2014). Institutionalism is defined as 
when NGOs pursue and embrace strategies, practices, processes and structures which have little to do 
with the performance and efficiency maximization but react to and seek ways to accommodate pressures in 
response to external security and regulations (Frumkin & Kim, 2002). Isomorphism occurs when pressures 
in the form of coercive scrutiny, evaluation and regulation from the outside grow, so organizations tend to 
become defensive and try to find ways to diffuse or eliminate this pressure by changing their internal 
practices and one of the easiest ways is to adopt those routines and structures which can minimize the 
conflict but such routines may lead towards inefficiency due to divergence from mission (Frumkin & Kim, 
2002). Fumkin and Kim identified government funding, licensing, inspection, and regulation as main levers 
for non-profit and for-profit isomorphism. 
Isomorphism is driven by three strong processes: a coercive process that requires submission to rules, 
regulations and laws dictated by a powerful party in the environment; a normative process driven by 
professional and social norms and values; and a mimetic process driven by high uncertainty (Hafsi & 
Thomas, 2005). The government as a source of funding becomes the enforcer of the rules and in this role it 
ensures rule compliance by obligations like external audits and when NGOs are convinced that government 
funding is linked with or depend upon financial reporting compliance, they make essential efforts to ensure 
compliance which increases efficiency (Verbruggen, Christiaen & Milis, 2015).  
A major outcome of isomorphism which is professionalism (Lu, 2015). Discussing the threats of 
professionalism as a result of isomorphism, Frumkin and Kim (2002) comment that while government funds 
may represent a critical source of revenue, particularly in the fields of health and human services, it may 
cause bureaucratization and professionalization in NGOs which results in inefficiency. They established in 
their study that receipt of government funding in the forms of grants and contracts can make an NGO more 
inefficient, more bureaucratic and professionalize in the operations. As a result of professionalization, 
Ali & Gull / International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science,  
Vol 5 No 6, 2016 ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
54
	
NGOs gradually divert from being well integrated into their communities and largely voluntary in nature, 
towards being bureaucratised organizations that deliver services on behalf of the government (Carey & 
Ayton, 2013). Professionalization of the NGOs has significant implications for community based 
approaches to health promotion, given the shifts it causes in organizational structure and workforce (Carey 
& Ayton, 2013).  
As a result of isomorphism, NGOs reported themselves feeling under constant pressure as a result of 
changing government policies, legislations and priorities and these pressures stemmed from managerial 
and financial functions, increased competition and increased expectations for efficiency and other internal 
pressures including internal crises, declining performance, obsolescence and conflict between members 
and the external environment (Spall & Zetlin, 2004). As a result of these pressures NGOs were becoming 
more enterprise oriented thus departing from their spirit (Spall & Zetlin, 2004).  
Another disadvantage of the government contractual funding is a negative impact on inter-organizational 
relationships (IORs). IORs emerge when NGOs make a formal or informal relationships with other NGOs to 
achieve joint outcomes (Lu, 2015). Government contracting system had caused loss of collaboration and 
cooperation among the NGOs and increasingly competitive inter-organization ethos affected collaborative 
service delivery, networking, referral, needs identification and problem solving potential on the NGOs 
(Rawsthorne, 2005). Rawsthorne (2005) survey found that contracting had affected collaboration and 
cooperation between organizations, especially large organizations were more likely to agree that the 
changed funding arrangement (contractual funding) had led to greater competition and less collaboration.  
Summing up the disadvantages of contractual government funding to NGOs, Eikenberry and Kluver (2004) 
commented that competition for contracts leads to replacement of a benevolent spirit, increases focus on 
management and public relation at the expenses of services, encourages provision of reimbursable 
services instead of social welfare, smaller revenue pools for community services, unsupported advocacy, 
concentration of power with larger service providers, threatens inter-organizational networks, devalues 
volunteer work and focuses on the bottom line instead of building social capital.  
Accountability 
As NGOs are engaging in more contractual and partnership relationships, they face changing demands for 
performance measurement and accountability, both upward to government and downward to their 
members, clients and the community (Barraket, 2006). As government’s relationship with NGOS evolve, its 
ability to impose its priorities on organizations increases, with the major tools for this increase being 
reporting requirements and increasingly specific regulation of organizations (Cunningham, Baines & 
Charlesworth, 2014). 
NGOs are with subject to two types of audits. Financial audits are conducted to ensure that there is 
complete material disclosure and that accounts are maintained according to the stipulated accounting and 
financial standards and performance audits which attempt to ascertain the efficiency, effectiveness and 
accomplishment of NGOs in view of their missions (Frumkin &Kim, 2002). 
Compliance-based accountability by government focuses on conformity of rules and punishment for 
violators (Carman, 2009). Accountability and conformity even begins before the issuance of a grant or 
contract to NGOs with the issuance of specific criteria regarding who is eligible to receive a specific 
contract or a grant, for instance, a licensing condition. Once a contract or grant is awarded, other external 
monitoring activities come into play, for example, visiting the sites and reviewing program documents and 
records to keep track of performance (Carman, 2009). Governments were found to not only work hard to 
monitor and increase the oversight they exercised over NGOs, but were also requiring more evaluation and 
performance measurements. Carman also found that the NGOs which rely on federal and departmental 
funding were more exposed to accountability requirements as compared to NGOs which relied on state and 
local funding.  
The costs associated with compliance and accounting requirements is also a source of a particular drain on 
NGOs’ resources and this has been further aggravated by the patterns of funding as NGOs typically 
receive funding from multiple government departments and from multiple government levels (local, state 
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and national), all having different requirements for reporting on the use of the funds (Spooner & Dadich, 
2010). Cunningham et al. (2014) in their study found that record keeping linked to targets and 
accountability associated with all the different models of government funding to NGOs significantly affected 
the workloads of NGOs and new and changing reporting requirements had often caused a loss of focus on 
clients’ services as well as a changed professional identity. 
The differences in the reporting requirements to different donor departments is another factor which 
negatively affect NGOs. Flack and Ryan (2005) in their study analysed the financial reporting requirement 
documents of 22 government departments involved in funding 31 different programs of the NGOs and 
found that all 31 different programs had special and different financial reporting requirements and all 31  
programs have had different sets of acquittal documents that had caused profound compliance costs to 
NGOs. Moreover, not only were there inconsistencies among government agencies for reporting 
requirements, but also with in one particular government department there was little consistency and 
harmony. Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2013) in their study concluded that in addition to extensive monitoring 
and reporting requirements, government financing typically implies that NGOs are no longer autonomous in 
defining their financial portfolios. Identifying the implication of accountability to large NGOs, Rawsthorne 
(2005) in his study found that larger the organization was, greater the belief that organization was more 
accountable to the government than to the community.  
Loss of Autonomy 
NGOs’ leaders expressed their anxiety over the loss of autonomy which comes with government money 
and feared that their political activity would drive away government funders (Chaves, Stephens & 
Galaskiewicz, 2004). Hamilton and Maddison (2007) quote a survey of  750 NGOs involved in advocacy 
and comment that most respondents reported government constraints on their independence with 70% 
reported that government funding at times restricted their ability to comment on government policy and 
90% believed that dissenting organisations risked having their funding cut. The authors noted that the more 
reliant an NGO was on government funding, the more constrained they felt in criticising government. Lloyd 
and Wise (2010) in their study quoted several participants expressing frustration at the point that funding 
decisions to NGOs were made according to political imperatives rather than moral, economic or social 
arguments. 
The closer ties of the NGOs with government and their restricted ability to provide political advocacy or to 
respond to communities, these organizations are sometimes referred as “proxy state organizations” (Carey 
& Ayton, 2013). NGOs with closer ties to government have constrained activities, for example, although 
such organizations carry out advocacy work, yet it is not up to the standards of broad political debates, but 
is only restricted to politically acceptable areas and mostly to the non-sensitive issues (Phillips, 2006). Such 
organizations tend to follow the central policy values set by the government and strengthen the political 
agenda of the ruling government. Parks (2008) states that NGOs autonomy is of great importance in 
domestic and political dialogue and advocacy activities and with close association with the government 
donor agency, NGO loses its credibility vis-à-vis the government, other political actors, and the rest of civil 
society. The NGO’s advocacy role for marginalised people is under serious threat with the increasing use 
of clause making funding conditional on non-engagement in political dialogue (Gray, 2013). 
The preference of government to fund project based programs over advocacy services also restrain the 
advocacy role of the NGOs. Casey and Dalton (2006) found that the government shift and priority to project 
based funding results in increasing percentage of available funding to specific activities and less funding to 
advocacy due to which advocacy can only be funded from the shrinking pool of uncommitted funds, private 
membership or fundraising. They further comment that the increased use of government contracting and 
competitive tendering effectively decouples the NGOs from policy and service provision roles which results 
in concentration of power over policy and services into the hands of governments. One of the most 
common and widely criticised effects of contemporary policy trend of tied funding and the new imperatives 
of partnership on the community sector, is that they limit NGOs’ capacity to advocate for the needs of its 
constituents or dissent from the status quo (Barraket, 2006). 
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Casey and Dalton (2006) concluded that contracting and project-based funding have decoupled the policy 
and service roles, and, instead of providing NGOs with greater participation in both may, have led to a 
concentration of power over policy and services in government hands. 
Mission Drift 
Mission drift arises when an NGO’s priorities and activities are mainly decided by its funders, consequently, 
the NGO’s functions then diverge significantly from its original mission (Bennet & Savani, 2011). The main 
reason behind the mission drift is the funder’s desire for an NGO to change its mission, objectives and 
operations to match the funder’s requirements (Bennet & Savani, 2011). When mission drift occurs, 
organizations’ objectives become increasingly aligned with government policies, rather than working with 
communities to challenge the government to create more equitable and socially responsive policies and 
programs (Carey & Ayton, 2012).  
The concerns were expressed about government agendas influencing organisational governance which 
was significantly difficult because different funding bodies, for example, the national government and the 
state/territory governments, have different agendas and NGOs were reportedly being driven by the 
priorities of funding bodies rather than by mission (Spooner & Dadich, 2010). Moreover, informants also 
questioned the value of government agendas that were driven by short-term election cycles, rather than 
long-term vision.  
Another aspect of mission drift is the inclination of NGOs towards top-down approach as compare to 
bottom-up approach.  Carey and Braunack-Mayer (2009) in their ethnographic case study identified that 
initially the NGOs operated on the more radical bottom-up principle of increased social justice through 
community participation, empowerment and advocacy, however, with an increase in state funding, it 
appears that this principle has started to be abandoned in favour of more conventional health promotion 
discourse, top-down approach, focusing upon disease prevention and population approaches.  
In his research on American NGOs, Chaves et al. (2004) quote a study, which found that increased 
government funding caused NGOs to redirect their attention, energy, and resources away from service 
delivery and advocacy and towards administrative activities such as grant-writing fundraising, and 
documenting the communities’ needs for services.  
In a case study of three non-profit charities in the UK, Bennet and Savani (2011) commented that the 
management of all three charities recognized that mission drift was an unavoidable consequence of 
receiving substantial volumes of government contract work. 
Crowding out 
After the government funding, donations are the second most vital revenue source of the NGOs. In 
literature, impact of government funding on donations is known as crowding out and crowding in effect. 
According to Kim and Ryzin (2014) the term crowding-out refers to a situation in which government funding 
displaces or discourages donations, whereas, crowding-in refers to the situation when government funding 
leverages or encourages private donations to an NGO.  
The general assumption is that government grants can crowd out private donation to NGOs mainly due to 
two reasons, first, donors view their involuntary tax contributions as a substitute of their voluntary 
donations, second, NGOs general strategic response to the fundraising becomes minimal after receiving 
government grants, which will eventually reduce the fundraising efforts and hence indirectly reducing the 
private donations (Breman, 2008). 
Brooks (2000) comments that NGOs which receive heavy funds from government start becoming quasi-
public agencies and since only few people give voluntary donations to the governments, fewer and fewer 
people become inclined to give to these organizations, moreover, since heavily funded NGOs often suffer 
the image of requiring public money to stay alive, and this may inspire little confidence among private 
contributors.  
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On the basis of his study, Brooks (2000) called government funding a short-run subsidy trap and comments 
that if a larger government funding subsidy has been used to increase the NGOs’ short term liquidity, the 
NGOs donations, both short-term and long-term would fall. Similar kinds of results were obtained from 
Borgonovi’s (2006) study that low level of government funding attracts a low level of private donation and a 
higher level of government funding increase private donation but after a certain threshold is reached, higher 
the level of government funding, lower the level of private donations. To test the impacts of the government 
funding on donation, Breman (2008) established that government funding crowded out 7 percent donations 
for all NGOs, 22.3 percent for health, 5.7 for social and 9.6 for other organizations. 
Advantages of government funding 
The cautionary claims of the government funding have not gone unchallenged and many researchers have 
seen the relationship between government and NGOs as complementary and mutually advantageous 
(Frumkin &Kim, 2002). NGOs capitalize on government’s steady financial support to improve the efficiency 
of the service delivery process mainly through the achievement of scale through large blocks of 
government support (Frumkin &Kim, 2002).  
In fact, some research has argued that the flow of public funds into NGOs allows them to expand 
substantially their operations and to achieve greater levels of operational efficiency and improved 
effectiveness (Frumkin &Kim, 2002). The data shows that on one hand, government grants have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the number of NGOs and on the other hand, numbers of NGOs and 
their fundraising efforts have a positive and significant effect on the amount of government grants 
(Luksetich, 2008). NGOs functioning with no government support might be entirely unknown or just starting 
out, and as such might benefit from the publicity and credibility which comes with a grant (Brooks, 2000).  
Explaining the advantage of competitive tendering process, Durham and Bians (2015) state that due to 
insufficient funding, NGOs have to operate in contestable markets for winning funds and these competitive 
tendering processes assume that competition between for and not-for-profit providers act as a catalyst to 
improve service delivery efficiency. Durham and Bians continue that contestability allows more providers to 
enter the market and compete for contracts, creating the stimulus for greater efficiencies, innovation and 
improved service delivery to consumers. Government usage of competitive performance based contracts 
and not giving NGOs preferential treatment provide for-profit sector to enter in the bidding process because 
of for-profit’s greater ability to sustain risk due to high capital and greater technological capacity to meet 
contract requirements and this phenomenon triggers the performance based approach among NGOs 
(Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). Competition for funding increases accountability and positive outcomes, 
incentives for NGOs to work harder, cut unnecessary costs, improve the overall influence and effectiveness 
of civil society in domestic and political environment.  As a result, high performing NGOs thrive and 
inefficient fade out (Parks, 2008).  
Government funding does not always cause mission drift. Rawsthorne (2005) in his study found that over 
half (58.3%) of the organizations he studied strongly disagreed that the new contractual funding 
arrangements had diverted their organizations from their vision and purpose. Rawsthorne continues that 
whilst government contracting has been detrimental for some NGOs, over a broader spectrum, the 
community development activities of these NGOs have been affected minimally and the negative impacts 
of contracting have been less than anticipated and these organisations feel able to continue to play an 
important developmental role in community life, regardless of the contractual arrangements.  
Government contracting requires NGOs to behave in a trustworthy manner over time and over transactions 
to develop familiarity and credibility and more broadly, this points to the imperative of building inter-
organizational trust with funding agencies which are more likely to survive and sustain (Lu, 2015). Yet if 
government funding causes mission drift, ot can have positive consequences for NGOs, by undertaking 
contract work well beyond the scope of their existing missions, NGOs can develop their competence, 
extend their capabilities, and become adept at building activities into a total package to offer to government 
funders (Bennet & Savani, 2011).  
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NGOs at times adopt several strategies to avoid mission drift effect of government funding. ince it is rare to 
find an alignment between donors and an NGO, negotiations are carried out over what to do and towards 
what ends, though mostly these negotiations are heavily influenced by donors, at time, NGOs hold an 
advantage, especially if there are only few NGOs in an area, in such case NGO would be able to advocate 
community needs to donors in better way (Parks, 2008).  
Favouring the structural changes or isomorphism as a result of government funding, Lu (2015) comments 
that NGOs with higher bureaucratic orientation, stronger domain consensus with government, and longer 
government funding history are more likely to receive government contracts and grants (Lu 2015). On the 
structural side, NGOs’ bureaucratic orientation plays a strong positive role in facilitating the flow of 
government funding and on the relational side, both domain consensus and funding history have strongly 
significant effects on attracting government funding (Lu 2015). 
Dependency (on government funding) is not only inevitable, but it is also necessary for survival as it 
increases the organization’s sensitivity to the environment and its ability to adapt to it (Hafsi & Thomas, 
2005). Supporting the inevitable dependency of most organizations on government funding, Hafsi and 
Thomas further suggest that this is not a curse and instead of competing for resources on an open market, 
organizations rather seek to increase legitimacy and support among the main actors upon whom they are 
dependent (government). In doing so, isomorphism takes place, and can be seen as a strategy to deal with 
such a dependency (Hafsi & Thomas, 2005). 
There are some studies which have shown that government funding result crowding out, rather causes 
crowding in. Smith (2007) in his study established that government grants can have the potential of the 
crowd in private donations from the rage of $ 0.14 to $ 1.15. Smith further advocates that overall there is a 
lack of evidence that government funds can have a negative impact in private giving and there are some 
evidences that government grants can have a small positive impact on donations in performing arts 
organizations.  
Heutel (2014) also found in his study that government funding crowd in private donations and especially for 
younger NGOs, which confirms the notion of signalling, where donors know less about a new NGO and 
view government funding as a source of credibility and worthiness of an NGO. Heutel also did not find any 
evidence of crowding out. Heutel (2014) states that if private donors have the better information about 
charity quality, their donations can act as signals to the government and crowd in government grants. 
Discussion 
From the review of the literature, the main impacts of government funding, such as, isomorphism, mission 
drift, accountability, loss of autonomy, and crowding out have received a mixed response from different 
researchers as evident from presented studies in this review. Some of the presented studies which have 
been analysed in this section to support the theory link these impacts with positive consequences while 
others link them with negative ones. As Spooner and Dadich (2010) state, there is mixed evidence about 
the impacts of government funding on NGOs’ independence, although there appear to have been some 
problems in this area, the extent of the problem is not clear.  
From the presented studies in this chapter, it has become clear that definite results are hard to draw to 
determine the impacts of government funding on NGOs and in fact these impacts depend upon a number 
of factors such as, age, size, sector and demography of an NGO. As according to Zappala and Lyons 
(2006), larger NGOs least relay on fundraising and more likely to have a diversified revenue base including 
revenue from government and commercial activities, whereas smaller organisations are more likely to 
depend on fundraising, moreover, organisations located in capital cities are also more likely to be 
dependent on fundraising revenue to carry for their activities. 
Political, economic and social environments with in which governments and NGOs contract and operate 
also play a role in deciding the nature on the relationship between two and service delivery pattern. Chaves 
et al. (2004) state that the relationship between government and NGOs significantly depends upon the 
environment in which both operates, on one hand, NGO is dependent on government for its funding, 
whereas on other, government agencies may also depend on that organization to deliver needed services. 
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Government agencies responsible for managing grants and contracts need qualified and capable 
nongovernmental partners with which to contract and if the number of such partners is limited in a given 
community or in a given arena, the situation is one of mutual dependence between government and the 
NGO that can deliver the service and in such case government influence on NGO would be minimal. 
(Chevs et al., 2004). 
Kearns, Bell, Deem and McShane (2014) concludes that the most important factor NGOs’ leaders consider 
is catalyst which means that leaders think strategically about the positive spin-offs that certain type of 
funding can produce by generating not only other types of funding, but also other clued resources like 
visibility in the community and partnerships, second, leaders are highly concerned about the importance of 
matching funding streams with mission alignment and board chairs seemed mindful of the pathologies such 
as mission drift in the quest for funding (Kearns et al. 2014). 
There are some scholars who believe that government as a donor has complete right and authority to exert 
and exercise its power over NGOs, and it is the duty of NGOs to fulfil all the conditions tied with 
government funding. As Gray (2013) states that as a matter of fact no individual or organisation has a 
constitutional right to government funding and governments are not obliged to fund any specific community 
organisations. Gray continues that if the government is free to decide whether to fund an individual or 
agency, it can impose conditions on the recipient of the funding and if the recipient does not like the 
conditions, it does not have to accept the money. 
Conclusion 
Government funding has been linked with causing isomorphism, loss of autonomy, mission drift and 
crowding out in the NGOs. Accountability requirements have also constrained the performance of the 
NGOs. For NGOs, receiving government funds is not cost free and NGOs leaders have become more 
aware of the negative impacts of government funding where onerous government oversight and regulations 
may lead to NGOs’ greater formalization, administrative inefficiency, and mission drift (Lu, 2015). However 
on the other side, there are number of studies which have termed government funding essential and vital 
for the survival of the NGOs, and in this regard, have also linked the above mentioned impacts of 
government funding for the sustainability and development of the NGO sector. This review has significantly 
managed to gather the dispersed research upon the negative and positive impacts of government funding 
and factors which interplay these impacts. This article may help the NGOs’ policy makers to better 
understand the consequences of the government funding and consider them during their planning for better 
performance. 
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